Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 28 | Issue 1

Article 14

Frozen Embryo Disposition in Cases of Separation
and Divorce: How Nahmani v. Nahmani and Davis v.
Davis Form the Foundation for a Workable
Expansion of Current International Family
Planning
Ceala E. Breen-Portnoy

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
C. E. Breen-Portnoy, Frozen Embryo Disposition in Cases of Separation and Divorce: How Nahmani v. Nahmani and Davis v. Davis Form
the Foundation for a Workable Expansion of Current International Family Planning, 28 Md. J. Int'l L. 275 (2013).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol28/iss1/14

This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

13-Breen-Portnoy

9/6/2013 12:03 PM

COMMENT

Frozen Embryo Disposition in Cases of
Separation and Divorce: How Nahmani v.
Nahmani and Davis v. Davis Form the
Foundation for a Workable Expansion of
Current International Family Planning
Regimes
CEALA E. BREEN-PORTNOY†

INTRODUCTION
“There is something deeply humane about this policy, the idea
that people have the right to be parents . . . . It’s something that
characterizes life here: the value placed on life.”1 Israel is the world
capital of in vitro fertilization (IVF).2 It is also one of the few
countries where IVF and surrogacy are legally permitted, regulated
on a national level, and administered by an administrative rather than
a judicial authority.3 By contrast, in the United States, IVF, while
widely available, is one area in which federalism reigns, producing a
hodgepodge of state legislation and regulation.4 However, Israeli and
American jurisprudence on this issue, though limited, far outstrips the
†

Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2012–2013; J.D., University of
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2013. The author wishes to thank her
family and friends for their support, and Professor Jana Singer for her advice and
enthusiasm.
1. Dina Kraft, Where Families are Prized, Help is Free, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at
A5.
2. Id. (“Experts say Israel’s rate still far outstrips the rest of the world. Four percent of
Israeli children today are the products of in-vitro fertilization, compared with about 1 percent
estimated in the United States.”); see also John A. Collins, An International Survey of the
Health Economics of IVF and ICSI, 8 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 265, 268 (2002) (including a
survey in which Israel had the highest rate of IVF cycles per million population per annum).
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. See infra Part I.A.
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current international dialogue, particularly in regard to the issue of
frozen embryo disposition in cases of separation and divorce. While
the international community recognized a right to family planning as
early as the Teheran Conference of 1968,5 the cryopreservation of
embryos and the issue of their “custody” is such a recent innovation
that international law has not yet caught up with medical
developments.6 Faced with a continually shifting philosophical
debate as to the proper balance between culture-dictated morality and
individual autonomy, the international community lacks consensus on
how to approach assisted reproductive technologies (ART).7 At the
heart of the problem as it pertains to frozen embryo disposition in
cases of separation or divorce is the absence of an international
definition of an embryo and its status (i.e., “person” or “property”),
which leads to problems of judicial classification (e.g., whether to use
contract law principles when interpreting disposition agreements).8

5. International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, Iran, Apr. 22–May 13, 1968,
Proclamation of Teheran, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.4 (Vol. 1/Part 1) (May 13, 1968)
(“Considers that couples have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children and a right to adequate education and information in
this respect.”).
6. The terms “embryo” and “frozen embryos” are used in this Comment for simplicity’s
sake and not as a legal status judgment. In places where language from a case is cited
directly, the term “pre-embryo” may be used. Scientifically, frozen embryos are in a preembryonic state similar to a zygote. The first time a baby was successfully born from a
cryopreserved embryo was in Melbourne, Australia in 1984. Before this point, IVF
procedures were performed shortly after fertilization. See First Baby Born of Frozen
Embryo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1984, at A16.
7. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes “the right to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 27(1) (Dec. 10, 1948). Likewise, the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action notes, “Everyone has the right to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications.” World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25,
1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July
12, 1993). It is notable that although both of the above declarations insist on the dignity and
human rights of the individual, neither makes a direct connection to assisted reproductive
technologies.
8. Not even the term “reproductive rights” has an agreed-upon meaning in international
dialogue. The African Charter on Human Rights specifically lists what it considers to be
sexual and reproductive rights. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa art. 14, July 11, 2003, available at
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/. However, most documents referring to
“reproductive rights” focus on family planning (“the right to decide the number and spacing
of children”), female empowerment, and the right to privacy. See, e.g., Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination Against Women art. 16,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. However, these sources do not address the dissolution of
marriages or the increasing availability of assisted reproductive technologies. See generally
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In the United States, the reproductive rights issue that continues
to make the most noise, especially in presidential election years, is
that of a woman’s right to have an abortion. Only six state supreme
courts have actually considered cases involving frozen embryo
disposition and divorce/separation.9 The lack of clarity and cohesion
on this issue within the United States10 is mirrored internationally.
For example, China officially maintains a “one-child” policy, but
there is evidence that ART guidelines are being flouted, particularly
by the wealthy.11 Other Western countries, including members of the
European Union, exhibit the full spectrum of approaches to
regulating ART.12 Even when countries such as Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom do regulate the cryopreservation of
embryos, they have no case law on the particular point of frozen
embryo disposition in cases of separation and divorce.13 Thus, in the
Julia Gebhard & Diana Trimino, Reproductive Rights, International Regulation, in 8 THE
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 930 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed.,
2012) (summarizing the extent of international initiatives and regulations in the area of
reproductive rights).
9. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d
1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174
(N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d
261 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
10. See infra Parts I.A.1, II.D.
11. Though technically the Ministry of Health requires conformity of reproduction
techniques with China’s “family planning policy,” surrogacy has become a way for the
wealthy to bypass the one child restriction. While there is no specific law against surrogacy
in China, the industry has operated in a gray area since 2001 when the Ministry of Health
prohibited hospital-based surrogacy procedures and the commercial exchange of fertilized
eggs and embryos. See Nicola Davison, China’s Surrogate Mothers See Business Boom in
the Year of the Dragon, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20
12/feb/08/china-surrogate-mothers-year-dragon. Scandal broke out in 2011 when it was
discovered that a wealthy couple had eight babies, five via surrogacy. Due to the high cost of
surrogacy (up to one million yuan), surrogacy tends to exacerbate the growing economic and
social inequality in China’s population. See China Couple with Eight Babies Sparks
Surrogacy Debate, BBCNEWS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china
-16275624; see also Shan Li, Chinese Couples Come to U.S. to Have Children Through
Surrogacy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/19/business/la-fichina-surrogate-20120219.
12. At one extreme, Germany prohibits cryopreservation of fertilized eggs and all forms
of surrogacy. Kirsten Riggan, G12 Country Regulations of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, THE CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & HUM. DIGNITY (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://cbhd.org/content/g12-country-regulations-assisted-reproductivetechnologies. At the
other extreme, Belgium offers complete ART coverage through its national health plan. Id.
In between, there are countries such as Spain where surrogacy is not recognized, but the
commercial donation of gametes is allowed for purposes of ART and research. Id.
13. See id. (indicating that both Sweden and Switzerland regulate for cryopreservation of
embryos for up to five years); Human Fertilization & Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37,
§ 14(1)(d)(4) (U.K.) (stating that embryos may be stored for up to 5 years). However, most
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area of frozen embryo disposition, while certain state practices and
international human rights laws may reflect patterns that could form
the basis of an international governance regime, it is not nearly
consistent enough at present to rise to the level of customary law.14
Israel remains the sole country, other than the United States, that
has dealt with this particular reproductive repercussion of divorce.
Israeli and American jurisprudence, though limited, addresses the full
gamut of possible approaches, often covering similar territory such as
equality of the sexes, the balance between constitutional and basic
rights, the enforceability of agreements, and the scope of consent.15
However, the two countries have reached opposite results, which is
perhaps reflective of the personal and complex nature of the problem.
The Israeli position, embodied in the seminal case of Nahmani v.
Nahmani,16 promotes a presumption in favor of the party desiring
implantation, while the American position, embodied in the Davis
decision and five subsequent state supreme court cases, 17 focuses on
the autonomy of the individual and places the presumption squarely
in favor of the party opposing parenthood.
This Comment will tell the story of both seminal cases, focusing
primarily on the courts’ conflicting views regarding rights-balancing
and the application of contract law to the resolution of frozen embryo
disposition disputes.18 My primary argument will be that, despite the
holes in both countries’ jurisprudence and the vagueness of current
international reproductive rights protections, a practical combination
cases in the United Kingdom and Australia have dealt with post-death disposition, and not
post-divorce disposition. See Jennifer Stolier, Disputing Frozen Embryos: Using
International Perspectives to Formulate Uniform U.S. Policy, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
459, 474–79 (1991).
14. See infra Parts I–II.
15. See infra Part II. See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); CFH
2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995-6] IsrLR 320 [1996] (Isr.). It is also worth noting here
that both rounds of Nahmani in the Israeli Supreme Court occurred after the decision in
Davis, and the Davis decision was both known and referred to by both the majority and
minority judges on the Israeli bench.
16. CFH 2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995-6] IsrLR 320 [1996] (Isr.) [hereinafter
Nahmani II]. This was the final hearing and decision in the Nahmani case. The first appeal to
the Israeli Supreme Court, CA 5587/93 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995-6] IsrLR 1 [1995] (Isr.),
will be referred to throughout as Nahmani I. When referring to the Nahmani saga in
aggregate, I will simply use “Nahmani.” The Israeli Supreme Court regularly refers to the
two parties in this case as Ruth and Daniel. For the sake of consistency, I follow the court’s
approach.
17. See supra note 9.
18. See infra Part II.
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of the Israeli and American approaches could provide a solid
foundation for international consensus on embryo “custody” and
disposition.
As a possible solution, I intend to offer the following
compromise position that pulls elements from both Davis and
Nahmani. Ideally, the state/judiciary would stay out of this type of
intimate family issue. However, in view of the State’s interest in the
health and welfare of its citizens, the couple’s interest in making a
sound decision, as well as the prevention of medical malpractice, a
standard framework should exist for disposition agreements. Such
agreements should bear a presumption of validity and enforceability
and be modifiable by mutual consent.19 In the absence of prior
agreement, and despite the other party’s present objection,
implantation should be allowed within a medically reasonable time
(limiting the amount of time the embryos can be preserved), so long
as the party desiring implantation has no alternative means of
achieving parenthood (genetic or adoptive)20 and agrees to take full
legal responsibility for any resultant child. Should the disputing
parties reconcile after the birth of the resultant child, the party who
opposed implantation should be required to adopt the child in order to
secure legal parenthood. In cases where there is no such
reconciliation or adoption by the “biological” parent, the child born
of the disputed embryo will not be allowed to inherit from their
“biological” parent—just as they typically cannot from a sperm or
egg donor—nor will the “biological” parent retain any legal
responsibility in the case of the death or incapacity of the child’s
legal parent.21

19. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
20. In the final disposition of the Davis case, Mary Sue wanted to donate, rather than
implant, the embryos into herself or a surrogate. Id. at 590. I refrain from addressing
donation scenarios in my principal argument because both parties lose control/custody in a
donation scenario, and donation is an area where Nahmani and Davis do not provide an
appropriate foundation for international consensus. The Davis court itself indicated that its
decision might have been closer had Mary Sue desired implantation for herself. Id. at 604.
21. However, note the recent case of a Kansas sperm donor being sued for child support.
Kansas: Sperm Donor is Ordered to Pay Support, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2013, at A13; Pia
Gadkari, Should Sperm Donors have Parental Duties?, BBCNEWS (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21482099.
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THE CASES: COMPLEX PROCEDURAL HISTORY MEETS UNIQUE
CULTURAL CONTEXT

Davis and Nahmani were both watershed cases in their
respective countries. However, the breadth and variety of the
opinions issued by each country’s judicial system, as well as the lack
of subsequent jurisprudence, tempered Davis and Nahmani’s
influence. Moreover, both high courts faced complicated fact patterns
in these cases of first impression. First, there was no prior agreement
regarding embryo disposition in either case. Second, by the end of the
proceedings, the Davises were both remarried and no longer wanted
to use the embryos themselves,22 while the Nahmanis were still
married to each other (though leading separate lives)23 and Ruth
Nahmani still intended to have the embryos implanted in a surrogate
in the United States and raise any resultant children herself.24 Lastly,
while the Davises and Daniel Nahmani had reproductive alternatives
available to them, the use of her frozen embryos was Ruth’s last
chance at motherhood, genetic or otherwise.25 The two courts would
eventually choose to start from different premises and with different
priorities: in the Israeli courts, Ruth’s desire to achieve biological
parenthood would be accorded special weight, whilst in Tennessee
and indeed in post-Davis jurisprudence, the autonomy of the party
not desiring parenthood took precedence.26
A. Davis v. Davis
1.

A Preliminary Note on ART in the United States

Contrary to the systematic and national approach employed by
Israel, IVF is one area in which U.S. federalism holds almost
monopolistic sway, producing a patchwork of legislation and
regulation that varies from state to state.27 The U.S. system, in which
22. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
23. See Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 9.
24. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 9.
25. In view of her age and the strictness of Israeli adoption rules, adoption was an
unlikely alternative. The Israeli Supreme Court did not even contemplate this option in its
decision except to categorize adoption as an “unattractive” option. Nahmani I, [1995-6]
IsrLR at 43–44.
26. See supra note 9.
27. See Ellen Waldman, Cultural Priorities Revealed: The Development and Regulation
of Assisted Reproduction in the United States and Israel, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 69, 88
(2006). At least three states have enacted legislation addressing frozen embryos. Roman v.
Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 44 n.6 (Tex. App. 2006) (“F LA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (couples must
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healthcare is not treated as a universal right, is characterized by high
cost, limited assistance from government or from insurance
companies, and conflicting jurisprudence.28 Even as late as 2006, less
than a quarter of states required insurers to provide some form of
ART coverage.29 However, even though the financial burden is high,
if an individual has the financial means to use ART, she does not
have to go through the State intrusions involved in the Israeli
process.30 For example, in the American system, the payor has more
choice regarding donor sperm and is not subjected to an evaluation
conducted by a social worker.31 The Davis case was an early
illustration of this uniquely American combination of accessibility to
ART and the pitfalls of a patchwork regulatory system.32
2.

The Story of Davis v. Davis

This case arose from the divorce proceedings of Junior and Mary
Sue Davis.33 At issue was the disposition of seven frozen embryos in

execute written agreement providing for disposition in event of death, divorce or other
unforeseen circumstances); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168–B:13–168–B:15, 168–B:18
(couples must undergo medical examinations and counseling; 14–day limit for maintenance
of ex utero pre-zygotes); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121–9:133 (pre-zygote considered
“juridical person” that must be implanted) . . . .”). As noted in the Introduction to this
Comment and as will be discussed later, the existing jurisprudence is not much more
extensive: only six state supreme courts and five state appellate courts have addressed frozen
embryo disputes, with no federal legislation. For a complete list, see supra note 9. The only
applicable statements made by the U.S. Supreme Court is that the right to procreational
autonomy is a basic civil right, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and the fetus
is not a human being under the Constitution, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). By
extension, a frozen embryo would not be a person under the Constitution.
28. Waldman, supra note 27, at 87–88.
29. Id. at 88.
30. For a description of the Israeli process, see id. at 85. For the U.S. equivalent, see id.
at 90.
31. Id. at 90. Despite this seemingly greater access to IVF, single and lesbian women in
the United States face a more precarious legal situation in the United States than do their
counterparts in Israel; even though some states have extended their parentage statutes to
protect unmarried women, some courts have overridden their state legislatures, invoking the
values of a traditional two-parent family in the face of a woman’s intent. See Melissa E.
Fraser, Note, Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization: Controlling Women's Reproductive
Autonomy, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 183, 197–98 (1998) (discussing limitations on lesbians’
access to IVF programs). There is also a campaign in certain states such as Louisiana and
North Dakota to define a “person” to include a fetus, contrary to the default position in most
Western legal systems. See Movement to Treat Fetuses as People Gains Ground, THE TIMESPICAYUNE (June 4, 2011), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/06/movement_to_
treat_fetuses_as_p.html.
32. See infra Part I.A.2.
33. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992).
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cryogenic storage.34 During their nine-year marriage, Mary Sue
underwent multiple unsuccessful IVF procedures as well as five tubal
pregnancies and a failed adoption.35 In December 1988, the Davises
tried the cryopreservation technique for the first time.36 Two of the
fertilized ova were unsuccessfully implanted in Mary Sue and the
remaining seven were placed in cryogenic storage for future
implantation.37 At the time of the procedure, the Davises were
informed that the likely storage life for the frozen embryos was two
years and that they could donate the remaining embryos to another
couple.38 The Davises made no decision on donation at this time, nor
did they sign any agreement with the clinic.39 In fact, the record
failed to indicate whether the Davises ever considered a contingency
agreement.40 At trial, the spouses disputed the status of their marriage
at the time of the final implantation attempt.41
During the initial round of litigation, Mary Sue requested
custody of the frozen embryos for implantation in herself, while
Junior preferred their maintenance in a frozen state.42 The trial judge
granted the divorce and awarded custody of the frozen embryos to
Mary Sue.43 For Judge Young, the primary issue was whether the
Davises had accomplished their intent to produce a human being.44
To that end, Judge Young chose to emphasize the status of the
embryo as that of a human being (as opposed to property).45 He also
applied the doctrines of parens patriae and “best interests of the
child” to the case: as the embryos are human beings, it follows that
34. Id.
35. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *2 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989),
rev’d, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff’d, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992).
36. Id. at *3.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
41. Id. Junior Davis testified that he was aware that the marriage was unstable for at least
a year but “hoped that the birth of a child would improve their relationship.” Id. Mary Sue
Davis testified to having no knowledge of any problems in the marriage. Id. According to the
record, a tentative plan existed to implant at least another one of the cryopreserved embryos
in Mary Sue in March or April 1989. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *3. Junior filed the original
divorce complaint. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
42. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
43. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *1.
44. Id. at *3.
45. Id. at *4.
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their best interest is to be given to Mary Sue for implantation, thereby
accomplishing the Davises’ original purpose.46
Junior Davis appealed the decision to the Tennessee Court of
Appeals.47 By this time, Mary Sue was domiciled in Florida and
preferred to donate the frozen embryos to a childless couple.48 The
court of appeals reversed the trial court, emphasizing that the issue
was one of control rather than custody, and that the Davises had a
joint interest and an equal voice in the disposition of the frozen
embryos.49 The court of appeals also held that according sole custody
to Mary Sue would constitute impermissible state action and would
violate Junior’s constitutionally protected right not to be forced into
parenthood.50 The court of appeals further observed that it would be
equally inappropriate and inequitable to order Mary Sue to implant
the ova against her will as it would be to order Junior to suffer the
consequences of forced paternity.51
Mary Sue next petitioned for review by the Tennessee Supreme
Court, which decided to hear the case (1) because of the case’s
importance in the development of the law of reproductive
technologies, and (2) because it felt that the court of appeals had
failed to provide sufficient guidance to the lower courts in the event
of continued disagreement of the parties.52 By the time of the hearing
before the Tennessee Supreme Court, both parties were remarried and
neither wanted the embryos for themselves.53
According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the essential dispute
was not the “status” of the embryos54 or how long to store embryos,
46. Id. at *11.
47. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff’d,
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
48. Id. at *1 n.1. Junior wanted to discard the frozen embryos. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
49. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3.
50. Id. at *2.
51. Id. at *3.
52. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
53. Id. Mary Sue preferred to donate the embryos and Junior preferred to discard them.
Id. Junior Davis’ new spouse was infertile. Brenda L. Henderson, Achieving Consistent
Disposition of Frozen Embryos in Marital Dissolution under Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV.
549, 550 n.5 (1992). Between the appellate court’s decision and the supreme court hearing,
Junior Davis expressed an interest in having at least one of the frozen embryos implanted in
a surrogate. Mark Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen Seven, 76 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (1990).
54. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594. The Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed the lower courts’
consideration of status, declaring that the issue was not dispositive in this case. Id. The court
agreed to address the question solely as a result of the requests of various amici curiae. Id.

13-Breen-Portnoy

284

9/6/2013 12:03 PM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:275

but “whether the parties would become parents.”55 The Tennessee
Supreme Court found the answer in the constitutional right to
privacy.56 For the purposes of the case before it, the court concluded
that the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights (to
procreation and to avoid procreation) that are both subject to various
protections and limitations.57 The Davises, as equivalent gameteproviders, constituted the sole interested parties in the continuation or
termination of the process; the State, lacking a public policy interest
specifically in this area, cannot interfere.58
In reaching its decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court first
highlighted the absence of a written agreement and the lack of a
relevant state statute in the case.59 It then declined to implement any
of the bright-line models proposed by scholars for resolving such
disputes, opting instead for an interest-balancing test in disputes
between progenitors where no prior agreement exists.60 In this case,
the court held that, absent an agreement between the parties, the
Knoxville Fertility Clinic should be allowed to follow its normal
procedures for the disposal of surplus or unwanted frozen embryos as
long as it did not conflict with the court’s opinion.61 Applying the
interest-balancing test to the facts at hand, the court emphasized the
psychological and financial consequences of unwanted parenthood
that would be placed on Junior and, in the opposite case, Mary’s

The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that frozen embryos could
not be considered “persons” under Tennessee law, but it disagreed with the court of appeals’
award of “joint custody” because the term implied a property interest. Id. at 597. This, the
court said, went too far. Id. at 595. The court concluded that the frozen embryos were neither
persons nor property, that they occupy an “interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life.” Id. at 597.
55. Id. at 598.
56. Id. This right is implied by both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Tennessee
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, and it encompasses the right to procreate, or procreational
autonomy. The court cited U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in concluding that the right to procreational autonomy was
included in the right to privacy, though its scope remains unclear. Id. at 600.
57. Id. at 601.
58. Id. at 601–02.
59. Id. at 590.
60. Id. at 590–91. The court adopted the following approach: first, ascertain the
preferences of the progenitors. In case of a dispute, use a prior agreement between the
parties. If no prior agreement exists, then employ an interest-balancing test. The objecting
party will normally prevail if the other party has other reasonable alternatives for achieving
parenthood. In no case should there be an automatic veto. Id. at 604.
61. Id. at 605.
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knowledge that the IVF procedure had been futile.62 Donation would
also cause Junior to lose both procreational autonomy and a potential
relationship with his biological children.63 The court concluded that
Junior had the stronger interest.64
The most important issue that the Tennessee Supreme Court
addressed, at least according to the frequency with which later courts
(including both Nahmani panels) referenced it, was one that the
parties failed to raise on appeal: whether the Davises could have
made a valid contingency agreement and whether that agreement
would now be enforceable.65 The supreme court reasoned that an
agreement should be presumed valid and enforceable and that any
modifications should be made by mutual agreement.66 In the absence
of modifications, the initial agreement would remain binding.67
Upon rehearing, the main issue before the Tennessee Supreme
Court was what guidance to give Junior Davis and the clinic director,
Dr. King, as to the final disposition of the frozen embryos. 68 The
clinic’s normal procedure was donation, the exact disposition Junior
sought to avoid.69 The court concluded that if the parties could agree,
the frozen embryos should be donated for research purposes; if not,
then the clinic was permitted to discard the frozen embryos. 70 The
court granted Junior Davis’ petition and remanded the specific issue
to the trial court for an appropriate conforming order.71
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case.72

62. Id. at 603–04.
63. Id. at 604.
64. Id. The court conceded, however, that the case would have been closer if Mary Sue
were still seeking implantation. Id.
65. The court decided that even without the issue being raised, it was clearly important to
address it so as to give guidance to the lower courts for future interpretations. Id. at 597.
66. Id.
67. Id. According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the court of appeals had failed to
provide a formula for a situation in which there is no initial agreement and no subsequent
agreement; its ruling in effect gave Junior Davis an absolute veto, assuring the destruction of
the frozen embryos due to their limited shelf-life. Id. at 598.
68. Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL 341632, at *1 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
69. Id. at *1.
70. Id. at *2.
71. Id.
72. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). Mary Sue Davis (now Stowe) was the
Petitioner.
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B.

Nahmani v. Nahmani

1.

A Preliminary Note on Israel’s Reproductive Culture

Israel is “unapologetically pro-natalist.”73 All Israeli women,74
no matter their sexual orientation or marital status, are afforded
access to IVF for up to two children at little to no cost. In fact, IVF is
included in Israel’s National Health Plan, instituted in 1996,75 and
ART is one area of Israeli life in which religious and secular law and
attitudes converge.76 The high value placed on life leads to significant
support for an individual’s right to be a parent.77 Indeed, the State’s
efforts over the last sixty years have transformed procreation from a
“private life quest into a public works project.”78
2.

The Unique Case of Nahmani v. Nahmani

Ruth and Daniel Nahmani married in March 1984.79 In 1987,
Ruth underwent a necessary operation that resulted in infertility.80
The following year, the couple decided to attempt IVF, implanting
the fertilized ova in a surrogate mother. However, in the late 1980s,
Israel’s Public Health Regulations precluded the implantation of ova
into one other than the intended mother of the child.81 To comply
with Israeli regulations and to cut costs, the Nahmanis decided to
conduct the fertilization in Israel and the surrogacy in the United
73. Waldman, supra note 27, at 68.
74. All citizens of Israel, whether Jewish, Arab, or other, have the same rights to state
fertility treatments. Id. at 82; Kraft, supra note 1. This benefit also applies to both married
and single women. Waldman, supra note 27, at 82. In fact, single parents receive a number
of state subsidies to make child-rearing feasible. Id.
75. Waldman, supra note 27, at 82–83.
76. Kraft, supra note 1.
77. See id. (“There is even a growing pool of single religious women using in-vitro
fertilization, the efforts sanctioned by rabbis.”). Unlike some countries, in Israel, single
parenthood is not stigmatized. Instead, it is seen as a life choice consistent with the national
procreation plan. See Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 47–48 (“One parent-families are
accepted in our society with understanding and even entitled to various forms of
assistance.”). According to some scholars, this sanctification of child-bearing has multiple
historical and cultural antecedents: the Jewish people’s covenant with God, the pressure to
replace the lost generation of the Holocaust, and concerns about the increasing rate of
intermarriage. Id.; see also infra Parts I.B.2., II; Waldman, supra note 27, at 70–75
(discussing the effect of Israeli culture on access to reproductive technology).
78. Waldman, supra note 27, at 87.
79. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 8.
80. Id.
81. Public Health (In Vitro Fertilization) Regulations, 1987, KT 5035, 978 (Isr.),
reprinted in 14 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 347 (1987) [hereinafter Public Health Regs.].
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States.82 However, in order to obtain the consent of the Israeli
hospital, the Nahmanis had to petition the Israeli Supreme Court for
permission to proceed with their plan, which the court granted in
1991.83 The Nahmanis completed the fertilization procedure, but in
1992, before they could proceed with the surrogate arrangement,
Daniel Nahmani left Ruth for another woman.84 Ruth applied to
Assuta Hospital for the release of the fertilized ova in order to
continue with the surrogacy process.85 Daniel opposed this action in
writing, both to Assuta Hospital and to the American surrogacy
clinic.86 Ruth then filed an action in the Haifa district court87 in order
to obtain the ova’s release and the non-interference of Daniel.88 The
trial judge, Justice H. Ariel, found in Ruth’s favor, relying on
contract law principles to hold that Daniel’s consent at the beginning
of the process included consent for all stages of IVF; once the process
began, he could no longer revoke his consent.89 The judge further
asserted that Daniel could not rely on a “change in circumstances”
argument as he was the one who instigated the change.90
a.

The First Hearing before the Supreme Court of Israel

Daniel appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Israel.91
Sitting as the court of appeals, a five-judge panel reversed the district
82. Surrogacy was not permitted in Israel at this time. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 8. At
the time of the litigation central to this Comment, there existed only a financial agreement
between the Nahmanis and the American surrogacy clinic that did not include contingencies.
No surrogate had yet been chosen, though testimony suggested that the Nahmanis had seen
an example of a surrogate agreement. Id.
83. HCJ 1237/91 [1991] (Isr.); see also Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 8.
84. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 8. This woman was not part of any of the litigation
between the Nahmanis, though she had children with Daniel. Id. In fact, the Nahmanis never
legally separated or divorced. Id. at 8–9. The Haifa Rabbinical Court recommended
reconciliation but it never happened. Id. at 9. Therefore, the Nahmanis continued to be
married throughout the course of the litigation discussed here.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id.
87. The text of this decision is unavailable. A summary of this opinion is found in
Nahmani I.
88. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 9.
89. Id. The court analogized the Nahmani situation to abortion cases: the husband does
not have the right to prevent an abortion or force pregnancy on a woman, so Daniel should
not have the right to stop the IVF/surrogacy procedure once the ova had been fertilized. Id. at
17. The court also worried that if the husband always won in these cases, he would have a
trump card in marriage and in dissolution proceedings, a powerful veto on the rights of his
wife. Id. at 9.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 9.
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court’s ruling by a 4-1 margin.92 The majority, led by Justice
Strasberg-Cohen, framed the issue as whether a woman has the right
to take possession of ova that were removed from her body and that
were artificially inseminated with the sperm of her husband for the
purpose of implanting them in a surrogate mother, when the husband
opposes the procedure.93 The court’s analysis is focused on balancing
the rights of the parties and the enforceability (or unenforceability) of
the couple’s agreement to pursue IVF and surrogacy. Though
acknowledging that Ruth’s right to be a parent is a basic right, the
court observed that this right did not include an obligation on Daniel
to help realize that right (i.e., “no forced parenthood”).94 Applying
the fundamental Israeli legal principle of equality of the sexes, the
majority concluded that the legal enforcement of unwanted
parenthood would be improper and in violation of Daniel’s
procreational autonomy, not to mention void as against public
policy.95 On contractual grounds, the majority concluded that
Daniel’s “consent” amounted merely to an unenforceable “weak”
agreement that did not imply consent to a continuation of the
procedure in case of separation.96 The majority also rejected the
district court’s interpretation of Daniel’s consent and its reading of
the Public Health Regulations as having gone too far.97
Out of sympathy for Ruth’s situation,98 the majority also took the
time to address—though it eventually dismissed—several additional
claims outside the scope of its primary holdings: estoppel, difficulties
of IVF procedure, alternative possibilities for motherhood, “status” of
fertilized ova, and “best interests of the child.”99 The majority
dismissed the first argument on the grounds that there was no
promise or representation upon which Ruth could rely, and that initial
consent to the procedure does not equal consent to the procedure’s
92. Id. at 49.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. at 19. For the majority, the rights to be a parent and not to be parent were (as in
Davis) two sides of the same coin, two constitutional rights derived from the right to
freedom and self-fulfillment. Id. at 16.
95. Id. at 18 (“The imposition of parenthood is contrary to ‘public policy’ and proper
legal policy, in that it is inconsistent with the basic values protected by our legal system.”).
The court also held that irrevocable consent to being a parent amounts to a full and eternal
waiver of the right not to be a parent, thus constituting a waiver of a basic right. Id. at 19.
96. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 29–30.
97. Id. at 22–23.
98. Id. at 48.
99. Id. at 41–48.
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continuation/completion even in the case of separation.100 StrasbergCohen dismissed the next two claims as unavailable because Ruth did
not have the right to impose the duty of parenthood on Daniel.101
Regarding “status,” the majority concluded that Jewish, Israeli, and
Western law all pointed toward the lack of an independent right to
life for the ova; thus, neither the “parents” nor the State have a duty
to continue the procedure.102 Lastly, the majority concluded that the
“best interests of the child” standard would not preclude relief in this
case, were relief available.103
By contrast, the sole dissenting opinion began with a declaration
that no legal norm existed that would be applicable to the present
situation and the enforcement of the obligations at issue.104
Overcoming that objection,105 Justice Tal responded point by point to
Justice Strasberg-Cohen. For Justice Tal, the heart of the issue was
the enforcement of obligations derived specifically from fatherhood
rather than the general enforcement of parenthood.106 Similar to the
majority, Justice Tal then proceeded to discuss the balance of rights
and even agreed that the right to non-parenthood was a basic right.107
He also agreed that, in an ideal situation, there would be joint and
continuing consent, with the parties knowing ab initio the
consequence of their consent.108 However, Justice Tal also observed
that not only was this a unique case,109 but that Daniel’s right to nonparenthood was not absolute. In fact, for Justice Tal, the debate was
100. Id. at 41–42. As Strasberg-Cohen noted, estoppel cannot magically override contract
law, general law, and public policy. Id.
101. Id. at 43–44.
102. Id. at 44–46.
103. Id. at 47–48. The majority opinion reasoned that were relief otherwise available, the
resultant child would have two parents who were married at the time of creation. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that one-parent families were relatively common in Israel, and
not ostracized. Id.
104. Id. at 50 (Tal, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is not always only one legal solution . . . where
there is such a competition, we should, in my opinion, prefer the solution that appears to be
more just.”).
105. Id. at 49–50 (“But society has no tools for making decisions and enforcing them in
the moral and social sphere, so it leaves the problem for the court to solve.”). On rehearing,
Justice Tal addressed the lack of a governing legal principle in his discussion of how a court
can “develop the law.” Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 357–58 (Tal, J.).
106. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 52 (Tal, J., dissenting) (“In other words, is it proper to
allow the biological procedure to continue, when at the end of it, if it is successful, it will
impose an emotional burden and financial obligations on [Daniel], against his will.”).
107. Id. at 50.
108. Id. at 62.
109. Id.
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between the “two evils” of forced parenthood (an inconvenience) and
infertility (violation of a basic, fundamental right).110 According to
Justice Tal, while both decisions will result in one of these two evils,
infertility denies the woman her fundamental right to be a parent and
thus trumps any right belonging to the husband.111 In terms of
consent, Justice Tal relied heavily on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel and returned to the trial court’s argument that the original
consent was sufficient to act as consent to the final goal (having a
child).112 Ruth relied on Daniel’s original consent, and based on this
consent she irrevocably changed her situation by undergoing the
procedure and using her husband’s sperm to fertilize the eggs.113
Again agreeing with the district court judge, Justice Tal concluded
that Daniel was estopped both from objecting to the continuation of
the procedure and to arguing a “change in circumstances.”114
Furthermore, since the Nahmanis were still married, Justice Tal
thought that the court should have been concerned with compelling
Daniel to carry out his moral obligations to Ruth under Jewish law.115
b.

The Supreme Court of Israel Rehears Nahmani

Ruth Nahmani petitioned the court for rehearing. Because of the
novelty of the case, the Israeli Supreme Court granted the rehearing
and assigned it to an unprecedented eleven-judge panel.116 By a 7-4
majority, the court reversed its previous opinion and granted the

110. Id. at 53.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 56–57.
113. Id. at 54.
114. Id. at 57 (“[S]omeone who effects a change cannot argued that he is entitled to
benefit of the change that he himself made, to the detriment of the other party.”).
115. Id. at 60.
116. Dalia Dorner, Human Reproduction: Reflections on the Nachmani Case, 35 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2000). In fact, the Nahmani case marked the first time that the Israeli Court
granted a second hearing on a case previously heard by a panel of more than three judges.
Janie Chen, Note, The Right to Her Embryos: An Analysis of Nahmani v. Nahmani and its
Impact on Israeli In Vitro Fertilization Law, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 335
(1999). At the time the case was re-opened, both Daniel and Ruth Nahmani spoke to the
press, Ruth expressing hope that she could still have a child, and Daniel expressing
disappointment as a citizen of a democratic country. Naomi Segal, Israeli Supreme Court
Reconsiders the Fate of Frozen Embryos, JWEEKLY.COM (Sept. 15, 1995),
http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/1591/israeli-supreme-court-reconsiders-the-fate-of-froze
n-embryos/.
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fertilized ova to Ruth.117 Reflecting the complicated and novel nature
of the subject matter, all eleven justices chose to write an opinion.118
The new seven-judge majority now held that an individual’s
interest in refusing parenthood could not be of primary concern
because the absence of parenthood lacks inherent value.119 Despite
some sympathy for Daniel, the court felt that Ruth’s right to realize
parenthood took precedence.120 The majority relied on a number of
arguments, many of which were previously addressed by Justice Tal
in the first hearing: promissory estoppel, Jewish heritage, the weight
of ethical justice in favor of granting parenthood, the primacy of the
wish to create life, and the balance of “evils” (infertility vs. financial
obligations).121 By contrast, the dissent, led by Justice StrasbergCohen, focused on the contract law elements of the case: (1) the
scope of consent and its revocability; and (2) the validity of a
partially-implemented agreement between the couple.122 The dissent
argued that the situation did not meet the requirements for promissory
estoppel, and that while there was an agreement, the consent lasted
only as long as the family unit was intact. 123 Moreover, Israeli
regulations124 and public policy dictated that there be continuing
mutual consent of both spouses at every stage of the IVF
procedure.125
No subsequent jurisprudence exists on this issue in the Israeli
Supreme Court.

117. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 321–23. Majority opinions: Justices Tal, Dorner,
Goldberg, Kedmi, Türkel, and Bach. Minority opinions: Justices Strasberg-Cohen, Or, and
Zamir. President Barak joined the minority opinion.
118. For the sake of brevity, a short summary of the main points is inserted here. Details
of the various justices’ opinions will appear throughout the analysis section of this
Comment. See infra Part II.
119. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 359 (Tal, J.).
120. See generally Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 355–444.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 327–55 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting); id. at 444–58 (Or, J., dissenting); id.
at 458–82 (Zamir, J., dissenting); id. at 483–88 (Barak, President, dissenting).
123. See, e.g., Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 342–43 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting);
Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 456–57 (Or, J., dissenting).
124. See Public Health Regs., supra note 81.
125. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 346–47 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting).
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II. DAVIS AND NAHMANI: RIGHTS, CONTRACTS, AND
FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

THE

POTENTIAL

In an ideal world, couples would make written provision for any
and all contingencies regarding the disposition of frozen embryos
before commencing the IVF process. In case of separation or divorce,
this written agreement would ideally help avoid many of the issues
the courts see today. The extent of any consent would have been
stipulated at the beginning, and the terms would define whether the
initial consent of both parties refers to the entire procedure through
implantation or is merely a renewable and revocable type of consent
to be determined at each stage of the process.
However, as duly noted by many of the justices on the Israeli
Supreme Court and by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this is not an
ideal world. Both the Davises and the Nahmanis failed to present a
concrete contractual claim because neither couple signed an
agreement with their respective fertility or surrogacy clinics, and
clearly the couples could not agree on whether even an oral
agreement existed between spouses.126 The contractual element thus
spawned in the courts a multi-faceted discussion of implied consent,
clarity of intent, and the legitimate expectations of the parties.
Additionally, in the absence of an agreement and in the absence of a
clear precedential deference to principles of contract law, both courts
addressed at length the competing rights of the parties.127
The extensive discussions of both courts provide a one-stop shop
for international negotiators seeking a comprehensive summary of the
principal arguments and points of dispute in the debate over frozen
embryo disposition in case of divorce. Both Nahmani and Davis
address the two principal elements of the debate—rights and
contracts—from a variety of angles. Combining the most practical of
their findings would create the foundation for a successful
national/international framework. Though both courts preferred that
the state/judiciary stay out of such intimate family issues, they also
realized that non-involvement was impractical and actually
impossible in situations of such intense disagreement. In view of the
State’s interest in the health and welfare of its citizens, the State
should encourage the execution of agreements that provide for the
126. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590, 598 (Tenn. 1992); Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR
at 8.
127. See infra Part II.A.
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disposition of pre-embryos in the case of separation or divorce and
promote the creation of uniform standards to aid couples in the
decision-making process. Such agreements should bear a
presumption of validity and enforceability and be modifiable by
mutual consent.128 In the absence of prior agreement, implantation
should be allowed within a medically reasonable time (limiting the
amount of time the embryos can be preserved), so long as the party
desiring implantation has no alternative means of achieving
parenthood (genetic or adoptive)129 and agrees to take full legal
responsibility for any resultant child.130
A.

The Rights Debate

A major compromise that the international community could
make in favor of efficiency and clarity would be to eschew the
interest or rights-balancing test where an agreement exists between
the parties. The balance of rights discussion is more an
ideological/philosophical issue rather than a practical issue: while the
American justice system provokes a more constitution-based
discussion on the issue of rights,131 the Israeli justices in Nahmani
freely roamed the question’s existential limits.132 At a minimum, the
adoption of a presumption of contractual enforceability, presented as
a natural outgrowth of the existing jurisprudence, might encourage
other countries to agree to an expansion of the existing framework for
the protection of individuals’ family planning rights.133
128. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
129. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
130. Another viable proposal takes into account the potential reconciliation of the parties.
Should the disputing parties reconcile after the birth of the resultant child, the party who
opposed implantation should be required to adopt the child in order to secure legal
parenthood. In cases where there is no such reconciliation or adoption, the child born of the
disputed embryo will not be allowed to inherit from their “biological” non-consenting
parent, just as they cannot from a sperm or egg donor, nor will the “biological” parent retain
any legal responsibility in the case of the death or incapacity of the child’s legal parent.
131. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598–603. This is not surprising given the supremacy of the
U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
By contrast, Israel relies on a series of Basic Laws in lieu of a written constitution. The first
Basic Law was enacted in 1958. Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958 SH No. 244 (Isr.). The
most recent Basic Law was enacted in 2001. Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001 SH
No. 1780 (Isr.). The full text of the Basic Laws is available at the Knesset’s website:
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod1.htm (last visited May 22,
2013).
132. See, e.g., Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 355–73 (Tal, J.); Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR
at 424–44 (Mazza, J.).
133. See supra notes 5, 7–8 and accompanying text.
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Unlike the Nahmani II court, the Davis court did not consider
itself faced with a normative vacuum in approaching this case of first
impression. While not explicitly found in either the Federal or
Tennessee Constitution, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared that
there is little argument that the right to privacy is grounded in the
concept of liberty featured in those documents, specifically in the
Fourteenth Amendment.134 After finding that the right of privacy was
also guaranteed under and protected by the liberty clauses of the
Tennessee Declaration of Rights,135 the Davis court proceeded to
hold that the right of procreation was a vital part of an individual’s
right to privacy.136 To support its reasoning, the court looked to the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma,137 which
found the right to procreate to be “one of the basic civil rights of
man.”138 The Davis court concluded that the right of procreational
autonomy, no matter its ultimate constitutional boundaries, “is
composed of two rights of equal significance – the right to procreate
and the right to avoid procreation.”139 Finding procreational
autonomy consistent with Tennessee public policy and federal
judicial precedent, the Davis court applied a balancing test that not
only recognized Junior and Mary Sue as equivalent gameteproviders, but that also gave equal weight to the right to procreate
and the right not to procreate.140
What eventually tipped the balance for the Davis court was the
burden of unwanted/forced parenthood on Junior.141 Donation of the
pre-embryos, as Mary Sue requested, would, according to the court,
rob Junior twice: not only would his procreational autonomy be
defeated, any relationship with his offspring would be prohibited.142
He also would suffer the psychological consequences of knowing a
child was out there, possibly born to a couple that would later

134. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598–99. The Davis court also cited Justice Brandeis’ opinion in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), regarding the right to privacy as being
“against the [power of] government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of
rights and the most valued by civilized men.” Id. at 599.
135. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600.
136. Id.
137. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
138. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600.
139. Id. at 601.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 604.
142. Id.
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divorce.143 The court did allow that the result of the balancing test
would have been closer if Mary Sue still sought to use the preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any
other reasonable means (including adoption).144
However, perhaps the most lasting legacy of the Davis court’s
decision is in fact the framework it laid out for future courts.145
Taking its own advice and applying it to the facts of Davis, the
Tennessee Supreme Court ordered that in the absence of an
agreement between the former spouses, the clinic at which the preembryos were stored should be allowed to follow its normal
procedures for the disposal of surplus or unwanted pre-embryos
unless conflicting with the opinion in this case.146
In both Nahmani hearings, the Israeli justices recognized the
value of Davis and Western legal tradition as a guide to how to
proceed in this situation, but the final Nahmani II majority skewed
the balancing test in favor of Ruth from the very beginning, thereby
undermining the same premise of equality espoused by the Davis and
Nahmani I courts. Both sides in the Nahmani case, recognizing that it
was truly a situation without precedent and lacking in legislative
guidance, took a subjective view of justice and relied on rights-based
arguments and various combinations of contract principles to make
their arguments. The result was that the Nahmani II majority opinions
have a tendency to focus on the search for the “just” result, whereas
the minority opinions seek to find some justification (or at least a
useful interpretation) in the existing law.147
In Nahmani I, Justice Tal set out what would become the
majority view on rehearing.148 He focused on the non-absolute nature
of the negative right (the right to non-parenthood).149 He argued that
Daniel’s right could be “overridden by the liberty, dignity, privacy
and autonomy of others.”150 Tal regarded the “balance of evils” as
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also supra Part I.A.
146. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604–05.
147. See, e.g., Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 376 (Dorner, J.) (“Indeed, not every moral
duty is a duty in law. But the law must lead to a just result.”); id. at 329 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]e are not operating in a vacuum. We have at our disposal the rich world of
existing law with all its branches that affect the issue under discussion.”).
148. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 49–62 (Tal, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 50.
150. Id.
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between the inconvenience of forced parenthood and infertility (aka
the violation of a basic, fundamental right).151 For Tal, the sequence
was clear: Daniel agreed to the procedure; Daniel changed his mind;
ergo, Ruth’s rights trump Daniel’s.152
Though the Davis court’s opinion was readily available and
indeed cited by the justices in the first and second hearings, the
Nahmani II majority failed to see symmetry between the rights of
being a parent and not being a parent.153 For the Nahmani II court,
the balance of rights discussion turned on human rights and ethics
and not so much on individual liberty. Reasoning that the force of a
yearning for a child is the most intense, the majority considered the
ethical weight of the right to be a parent as being “immeasurably
greater than” the weight of the right not to be a parent.154 Moreover,
the right to be a parent should be recognized alongside the right to
life as an independent basic human right.155 However, even Justice
Tal conceded that existing authorities lacked clarity on this issue.156
Undeterred, Justice Tal and the majority justices concluded that the
right to be a parent should not be viewed simply as a derivative of the
autonomy of the will, but as part of the basic right to life sanctified in
Jewish history and in the history of mankind in general. 157 In view of
the intensity of the implicated emotions, the ethical weight of the
right to be a parent trumps the right not to be a parent,158 or, as
Justice Türkel concluded, the mere life potential of the fertilized ova
immediately tipped the balance of rights in favor of Ruth.159

151. Id. at 53.
152. Id.
153. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 359 (Tal, J.).
154. Id. at 408 (Türkel, J.).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 61 (Tal, J., dissenting). Under Jewish law, the
husband has a duty to give his wife a child if she wants one. Id. at 58. In the present case,
although the difficulty of procreation originated with Ruth, Tal notes that Daniel knew of
this difficulty, and therefore his consent again becomes an absolute moral obligation. Id. at
60.
157. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 407–08 (Türkel, J.).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 409. Justice Bach shared Türkel’s preference for the position of the person who
wishes to grant life and bring a living being into the world; even if the scales of justice were
balanced here, “just this thought would tip the scales.” Nahmani II, [1995-6] at 423
(Bach, J.). Despite Türkel’s bold statement of “I choose life,” there can be agreement on the
“point of no return,” or the moment where the wife’s control over her body and the embryos
becomes absolutely paramount: implantation. Id. at 344 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting).
Justice Kedmi notes that the balance is already shifting towards continuation and
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The Nahmani II majority’s acknowledgment of Davis while
arriving at the opposite result is particularly marked in those majority
opinions, most notably that of Justice Dorner,160 which took a more
practical and straightforward approach to the rights issue. Dorner and
her colleagues first asked themselves whether the husband’s right not
to be a parent, based on his ‘ownership’ of half of the genetic
material of the ova fertilized with his sperm, really takes precedence
over the right of Ruth, who also contributed half of the genetic
material of these ova, to be a parent.161 Second, they asked
themselves what effect the equality of the sexes had on the
relationship of the parties to the fertilized ova.162 For Justice Dorner,
equality of the sexes meant that Daniel and Ruth had equal status
with regard to their relationship to the fertilized ova and that there
was no reason to make a sex-based distinction with regard to the
yearning for parenthood.163 Dorner’s balancing test incorporated the
following factors: the current stage of the procedure (the more
advanced, the greater the weight of the right to be a parent), the
representations made by the parties, the expectations thus raised and
preservation once fertilization has occurred, but even he agrees that the parties have a joint
right and double consent prior to implantation. Id. at 403–04 (Kedmi, J.). It is also notable
that no regional or international convention has granted an absolute right to life to a fetus,
even a viable one. See Rhonda Copelon et al., Human Rights Begin at Birth: International
Law and the Claim of Fetal Rights, 13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 120, 120–26 (2005)
(highlighting approaches to a “right to life” across multiple international and regional
agreements). Therefore, one can easily see grounds for an international consensus that frozen
embryos, which have not even developed into fetuses, do not have an independent absolute
right to life.
160. An interesting opinion that combines elements of Justices Tal and Dorner’s
approaches while presenting a unique take is that of Justice Goldberg. Nahmani II, [1995-6]
IsrLR at 388–402 (Goldberg, J.). Justice Goldberg’s conditional decision in favor of Ruth is
a rational compromise. While concurring in the result, Goldberg found that both rights in
play derive from the values protected by Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and
are in fact in stalemate. Id. at 390. Goldberg notes that even the ubiquitous “reasonable man”
cannot help. Id. at 393. Goldberg reverts instead to the “lesser-of-two-evils” method to find
the just solution. Both infertility and coerced parenthood involve emotional harm. Daniel’s
duties, mainly economic, may be mitigated by indemnification. Goldberg also adopted the
reliance argument and the possibilities of alternative motherhood as factors. As a married
woman, Ruth cannot freeze an ovum fertilized with the sperm of someone not her husband,
and in any case she can no longer physiologically undergo another procedure. Id. at 400–02.
161. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 376 (Dorner, J.).
162. Id. at 382.
163. Id. By contrast, Strasberg-Cohen declared that it was by principle of equality that the
court should refrain from imposing parenthood. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 18 (StrasbergCohen, J.). Both positions stem from an equally appropriate premise. The special status and
the lifelong implications of parenthood lead not to the presumption in favor of the implanting
spouse, but to equality of both spouses and the idea that parenthood should not be forced on
an unwilling party.
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any reliance (application of classic estoppel), and the alternatives that
exist for realizing the right of parenthood.164 Therefore, even though
the Nahmanis, like the Davises, were equivalent gamete-providers,
their rights were not equal, and Justice Dorner concluded that the
factors tipped in favor of Ruth.165
However, Justice Strasberg-Cohen (now in the minority),
adhering to the Davis court’s analysis, observed that the right to be a
parent, while a basic right, did not impose an obligation on one’s
spouse to help realize that right.166 She agreed with Daniel Nahmani
and Junior Davis that parenthood should not be coerced by the legal
system and that the procedure was based on joint parenthood.167
Strasberg-Cohen also agreed with Justice Tal and the Davis court that
the right to parenthood is not only derived from the right to individual
autonomy, freedom, and dignity—also enshrined in the 1992 Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty168—but is also a “basic human
right to which every person is entitled.”169 However, analogizing
from a different area of the reproductive rights debate, she reasoned
that, “just as a husband cannot oppose abortion by his wife, so a wife

164. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 385 (Dorner, J.). Justice Mazza classifies the
competing rights in Nahmani as a fundamental/general right (the right to be a parent) vs. a
specific right (the right not to be a parent of these specific ova). Id. at 424–26 (Mazza, J.).
The restrictions that the two parties want to impose are also classifiable, a quasi-general
restriction on Ruth (probable infertility or inaccessible parenthood) and a specific limitation
on Daniel (the imposition of unwanted parenthood of these specific ova). Id. at 439. Justice
Mazza points out, however, that while both restrictions are serious, they are not equal. Id.
Not only is a quasi-general restriction more serious than a specific restriction, but Ruth’s
right is stronger, and the restriction on Daniel is less violative of his rights. Id. at 441.
However, Mazza qualifies his preference for Ruth much as Justice Goldberg does, preferring
a conditional grant subject to no financial demands on Daniel. Mazza argues that, should
Ruth turn to Daniel with financial demands, it would put into doubt her good faith. Id. at
443–44.
165. Id. at 388 (Dorner, J.).
166. Id. at 333–36, 354 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 333. The Attorney-General, in his opinion, argued that forced parenthood was
contrary to public policy, legal policy, principles of equality between the sexes, and
individual rights. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 10 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.). Justice StrasbergCohan also notes that “[t]he desire to minimize State intervention in relationships within the
family unit, whether directly or through the legal system, emphasizes the right of autonomy
of this unit, which is protected against intervention both in the relationship between the
family unit and the State and in the relationship between the members of the family unit inter
se.” Id. at 16.
168. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992 SH No. 1391 (Isr.).
169. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 14 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.) (quoting CA 451/88 A v.
State of Israel 44(1) IsrSC 330, 337 [1990] (Isr.)).
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cannot oppose her husband’s demand to stop the fertilization
proceedings.”170
Interestingly, the Nahmani II majority, while prioritizing the
biological link on behalf of Ruth, often ignored the
biological/emotional implications of unwanted parenthood for
Daniel, choosing instead to merely note the financial and property
implications of parenthood. By contrast, Justice Strasberg-Cohen
believed that coercion exists even if the resultant child would have no
relationship with Daniel.171 President Barak also noted this crucial
detail in his opinion:
Ruth Nahmani is not merely asking to be a mother.
Ruth Nahmani is asking to be the mother of the child
of Daniel Nahmani . . . while Ruth does have a
constitutional liberty to be a mother, she does not have
an automatic constitutional right to be a mother to the
child of Daniel Nahmani.172
This is in stark contrast to the view of the majority, which
believed that while the right to parenthood implicated the basic civil
rights of man,173 the right to non-parenthood contained no inherent
value.174 In fact, citing the Bible, Justice Tal asserted that taking
away parenthood is akin to taking away one’s life.175 Squeezing the
reasoning of Davis in support of his point, Tal argued that denying
the interest of non-parenthood imposes undesirable burdens that are
not the equivalent of taking a life.176 However, the Nahmani II
majority harps on “justice” to a fault, losing the principle of equality
of the sexes that multiple justices list as paramount in the law.177

170. Id. at 17.
171. Id. at 18 (“The coercion exists even if the desired child grows up with the mother
without any relationship with the father who will live in another family unit, since the bond
of parenthood cannot be severed.”).
172. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 483–84 (Barak, President, dissenting).
173. Id. at 359 (Tal, J.) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 361.
176. Id. at 361–62.
177. In view of the sheer number of opinions, Justice Dorner suggested the following
categorical division among the justices: 1) an absolute preference for the spouse who does
not want to be a parent (Justice Strasberg-Cohen in both Nahmani cases); 2) absolute
preference in all circumstances for the right to parenthood (Justice Kedmi in Nahmani II);
and 3) justice as a balance of the rights of the specific parties (Justice Tal, in both Nahmani
cases). Id. at 382–84 (Dorner, J.). In her later article on the Nahmani case, Justice Dorner
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In order to forge a solid basis for expanding the existing family
planning international law framework,178 it is necessary to apply a
narrowest grounds/broadest compromise approach to the dozen
opinions involved here. The most practical framework would
combine the idea of two equal rights179 with the application of a
balancing test in the absence of agreement.180 The balancing test,
slightly weighted toward the party desiring implantation, should
include the following caveats: that the party desiring parenthood
make no financial demands on the other party181 and/or it is the proimplantation party’s final shot at genetic or adoptive parenthood.182
B.

IVF Consent Agreements: Enforceable?

Ideally, decisions as to the disposition of frozen embryos would
be made by both spouses and with the consent of both. However, in
the absence of consent, the spouse wishing to continue with
implantation should be allowed to do so, with caveats. Everyone can
agree that when spouses originally agree to any assisted reproductive
procedure, their agreement is based on the foundation of a
functioning married life and a joint future that includes the birth of a
child desired by both spouses.183 Difficulties arise when the family
unit and thus the main consent collapses, either through separation or
divorce, before the joint goal is achieved. In these cases, such as
Nahmani, a disposition agreement should already exist between the
parties or uniform guidelines should dictate the presumptions in the
absence of agreement. Informed consent requires an “awareness of
the circumstances in which the consent will operate.”184 By its very
nature, the IVF process embodies the consent of both spouses;

addressed the multiplicity of approaches to justice advocated by members of the Nahmani II
majority: (1) an absolute approach to justice (espoused by Justices Kedmi and Türkel); (2)
justice as that which does the least harm (Justices Goldberg and Mazza); and (3) justice as a
balance of the “rights and circumstances of each side” (Justices Tal, Dorner, and Bach).
Dorner, supra note 116, at 5–6.
178. See supra notes 5, 7–8 and accompanying text.
179. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992). For a thorough discussion of
this idea, see the opinions of Justice Strasburg-Cohen in Nahmani I and Nahmani II.
180. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603–04; Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 355–73 (Tal, J.);
id. at 373–88 (Dorner, J.).
181. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 401 (Goldberg, J.); id. at 443–44 (Mazza, J.).
182. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604; Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 361 (Tal, J.). Adoption
is certainly a viable option, but it is rarely addressed by the courts.
183. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 337–43 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 341.
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without it, there is no possibility of beginning the fertilization
procedure.185
Despite the lack of an agreement in the Davis case,186 the
Tennessee Supreme Court made a point of addressing the issue of
cryopreservation/IVF agreements, recognizing that the situation in
Davis (no disposition agreement) would be an outlier in the future.187
The court clearly understood the unique situation it faced: no initial
agreement, no agreement since, and no formula from the court of
appeals as to what to do if the parties cannot reach an agreement in
the future.188 For the Davis court, “establishing the locus of the
decision-making authority in this context is crucial to deciding
whether the parties could have made a valid contingency agreement
prior to undergoing the IVF procedures and whether such an
agreement would now be enforceable.”189 Dismissing both an implied
contract and a one-party veto theory as the basis for its analysis, the
court declared that frozen embryo disposition agreements should be
“presumed valid and should be enforced as between the
progenitors.”190 However, the court also recognized that “life is not
static.”191 It therefore adjusted its rule to allow for mutually agreedupon modifications that the court reasoned would protect the parties
against some of the inherent risks of such agreements.192 However, in
the absence of such an agreement, the court was clear that prior
agreements should be considered binding.193 This presumption of
enforceability, with room for mutual modification, would become

185. Id. at 337.
186. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598. Additionally, the Davises “were not asked to sign any
consent forms. Apparently the clinic was in the process of moving its location when the
Davises underwent this last round and, because timing of each step of IVF is crucial, it was
impossible to postpone the procedure until the appropriate forms were located.” Id. at 592
n.9. Unlike the majority and minority opinions of the Nahmani II court, the Davis court
found no agreement between the Davises. Id. at 598.
187. Id. at 597. Despite the court’s reluctance “to treat a question not strictly necessary to
the result in the case,” it concluded such discussion was necessary for the future guidance of
all parties to IVF procedures in Tennessee. Id.
188. Id. at 598.
189. Id. at 597.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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Davis’ primary legacy, cited and utilized by later courts (including
Nahmani).194
A presumption of enforceability is desirable for reasons ranging
from clinical efficiency to the minimization of misunderstandings and
the maximization of procreative liberty. First, the embryo inhabits a
legal gray area between property and person, the ambiguity of which
supports the need for an unambiguous contract.195 This status also
helps to overcome the concerns of some courts of becoming too
involved in what they consider “intimate questions inherent in the
marriage relationship.”196 Second, the disposition agreements in
question do not exist between the spouses but between the couple and
the IVF clinic. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in observing that IVF
is a widely-used procedure, recognized that there is a definite need
for agreements between the participants and the clinics.197 Such an
agreement is therefore analogous to a business transaction, an area in
which explicit agreements are encouraged, contingencies explored,
and intentions spelled out in writing in order to avoid costly litigation
down the road.198 The New York Court of Appeals also noted the use
of advance directives in healthcare that “minimize misunderstandings
and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the
authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially
personal, private decision.”199 The court went on to assert that written
agreements provide a necessary certainty in the “effective operation
of IVF programs.”200 Lastly, the freedom to contract is a wellestablished principle that supports the presumptive enforceability of
embryo disposition agreements.
C. Consent and Estoppel
In establishing an international framework premised on the
enforceability of agreements between spouses as to the disposition of
frozen embryos, countries should follow Davis and the Nahmani II
194. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 21 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.); see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725
N.E.2d 1051, 1055–57 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
195. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594–97. The court concluded that the pre-embryos in
question occupied an “interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their
potential for human life.” Id. at 597.
196. See, e.g., A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 158.
197. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001).
198. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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minority to avoid the emotional pitfalls of promissory or classic
estoppel.201 The words “promise” and “representation” simply do not
fit well with the special circumstances of spousal separation and
embryo disposition. Furthermore, even if the grounds for estoppel
were proven, the principal remedy is reliance damages, not the
enforcement of an agreement.202 For the sake of consistency, an
international framework should simply rely on the enforceability of
the agreement, with the caveats already noted above for last-chance
parenthood and mutual modification.
Moreover, estoppel cannot replace consent, which is the true
crux of the dispute and which goes back to the intentions of the
parties.203 In fact, it is probably safe to assume that in most cases
couples would believe that consent to IVF when the couple is
together does not include consent to its continuation in case of
separation. In Ruth’s case, she underwent the process in spite of the
risks of the procedure, and likely would not have been daunted by the
risk of a separation and refusal that did not exist at the time.204 In
fact, as Justices Or and Zamir argued, there was no evidence in the
record to show that the Nahmanis had ever considered the question of
continuation of the procedure in case of separation.205 In sum, there
was no representation upon which Ruth could rely.206 Lastly, the
minority in Nahmani II noted that the Israeli Public Health
Regulations207 and the recently enacted Surrogacy Law208 required
continuing mutual consent for most medical procedures. Even Justice
201. By contrast, the Nahmani II majority, leaning heavily on the reliance element of
estoppel, had to contort the facts and the law to make its argument. According to Justice Tal,
as articulated fully in Nahmani I, Daniel’s original consent was the promise, and that consent
was to the final goal of having a child, not simply of starting the IVF procedure. Nahmani I,
[1995-6] IsrLR at 61 (Tal, J., dissenting). Ruth relied on Daniel’s promise by going through
the first part of the procedure, an irrevocable change in the wife’s situation. Id. at 57. Tal
even found evidence of the modern reliance interest in Talmudic law in addition to citing
Australian case law and the U.S. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Id. at
54–56. Justice Bach also brought up “moral” estoppel, arguing that estoppel existed because
at one time Daniel wanted a child and submitted to the IVF process with that goal in mind.
Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 423 (Bach, J.).
202. See, e.g., Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 42 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.).
203. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 476–77 (Zamir, J., dissenting).
204. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 42 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.).
205. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 476 (Zamir, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. See Public Health Regs., supra note 81, at nos. 8(b)(3), 9, 14.
208. The Surrogacy Agreement (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law was
enacted on March 7, 1996. Justice Strasberg-Cohen discusses sections 2(1) and 5(c) of the
new law on page 347 of Nahmani II.
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Tal conceded that in an ideal world he would recommend joint and
continuing consent, allowing the parties to know ab initio the
consequences of their actions.209 It is this early awareness of each
parties’ obligations that this Comment seeks to encourage in its
proposed framework for an international consensus.
Determining the terms of the parties’ “joint will” or “legitimate
expectations” is of prime importance where there is no agreement, or
if an existing agreement requires interpretation. In Nahmani II,
Justice Tal argued that recognizing the legitimate expectations of the
parties requires the law to recognize the emotional aspect of ART.210
The Davis court and the Nahmani II minority also conceded the
special nature of the parties’ agreement as well as the unique status of
a frozen embryo (neither person nor property).211 Intentions are
imputed to someone when there is no way of assessing the presumed
intention of the parties; it can be imputed for considerations of justice
or considerations of policy.212 Here, taking into account
considerations of justice—including the balance of evils and the
presence of the criteria for promissory estoppel—Justice Tal
concluded that neither party should gain an unfair advantage and that
“in the absence of explicit consent with regard to a case of separation,
an intention should be imputed to the parties that no party can change
his mind.”213
Justice Strasberg-Cohen rightly criticized the majority’s rigid
view of consent, which froze Daniel’s consent to the IVF procedure
at the moment of fertilization.214 Daniel’s contribution (from
choosing the surrogate mother to the financial and legal liabilities

209. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 62 (Tal, J., dissenting).
210. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 362 (Tal, J.).
211. See supra note 195 and accompanying text; Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 339–40,
347 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting); Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 20–22, 44–45.
212. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 363 (Tal, J.).
213. Id. at 363–64. In addition, several justices have analogized embryo disputes to
abortion cases. From Israeli abortion law Justice Tal infers that “[w]hen not speaking of
interference in her body, the woman is not entitled to destroy the embryo without her
spouse’s consent; in exactly the same way, the man is not entitled to destroy the ova against
the woman’s wishes,” and she is not entitled to destroy the ova against his wishes. Id. at
369–70. Under Israeli law therefore, “the wife [should be] entitled to continue the
implantation procedure, notwithstanding the husband’s opposition.” Id. at 370. As explained
in his estoppel reasoning, under Jewish law the husband has an unenforceable obligation to
his wife to help her bring children into the world. As Justice Tal explains, “The husband is
liable to help, and he most certainly is not permitted to sabotage the process.” Id. at 372–73.
214. Id. at 340 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting).
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incurred from legal parenthood) is far from over.215 To support her
argument that informed consent of both spouses at each stage of the
procedure is required, Strasberg-Cohen cited the procedures and
recommendations of several Western jurisdictions, including the
United States.216 Within Israel, Strasberg-Cohen referred to the 1987
Public Health (IVF) Regulations217 and the recommendations of the
Aloni Commission.218 The former emphasized the need for spousal
consent,219 while the latter supported the Davis approach.220 Even the
Surrogacy (Agreements) Law of 1996 required written consent
between the surrogate and the intended parents; implantation is the
point of no return (until then, the consent of both parties to the
procedure is required).221 According to Strasberg-Cohen, the final
construction of the Surrogacy Law derived from the basic ethical

215. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 39 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.). Strasberg-Cohen also made
the argument that, even if the original consent could continue in the new circumstances,
enforcement would be contrary to sections 3(2) and 3(4) of the Contracts Law because the
law is not interested in forcing a relationship he does not want and because the personal
elements contained in the agreement here are much greater than in any contract for personal
service. Id. at 38–39.
216. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 345 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting).
217. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 22–23 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.).
218. Id. at 24. The Aloni Commission was a “professional public commission” appointed
by the Ministers of Justice and Health in June 1991 to “examine the question of in-vitro
fertilization.” Id.; see also Waldman, supra note 27, at 83.
219. Public Health Regs., supra note 81.
220. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 24 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.) (“‘[I]n the absence of joint
and continuing consent, no use should be made of the fertilized ova that were frozen until
the end of the freezing period agreed by the spouses but consent that was given at the
beginning of the treatment shall be deemed to continue as long as neither of the spouses
revokes it in writing . . . . [A] man or woman should not be forced to be a father or mother
against their will, even if they initially consented to this.’”) (quoting REPORT OF THE
PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC COMMISSION FOR EXAMINING THE ISSUE OF IN-VITRO FERTILIZATION 36
(1994)). The Public Health Regulations are also notable for the restrictions on the scope of
IVF. See Public Health Regs., supra note 81, arts. 6, 8; see also id. no. 11 (“A fertilized
ovum shall be implanted only in a woman who intends to be the mother of the child.”); 14(b)
(“Each act relating to IVF in a married woman may only be performed with her husband’s
consent.”).
221. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 347 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting). As in the United
Kingdom, there is a five-year maximum for frozen embryo storage. See id.; Public Health
Regs., supra note 81, no. 9. For additional discussion of the relevant Israeli policy
surrounding mutual consent, see Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 24 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.); id.
at 62 (Tal, J., dissenting); and Nahmani II [1995-6] IsrLR at 454-55 (Or, J., dissenting). Note
that the Surrogacy Law, though discussed in Nahmani II, was enacted too late to be
applicable to Nahmani II.
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recognition that regarded “parenthood as a journey taken by two
people together.”222
A final element involving consent that was explicitly promoted
by Nahmani and implicitly acknowledged by Davis is the
requirement that any proposed agreement or contract requires good
faith.223 Both Israel and the United States recognize this principle; it
is notable that, despite the variations among the opinions, most of the
justices, even in Nahmani, agree that the parties acted in good
faith.224 Non-consent, like every legal act, requires good faith.225
Good faith demands that a contract is given a meaning that is
consistent with the joint intentions of the parties and with the basic
principles of the legal system.226 “Love and friendship cannot be
forced,”227 and not giving consent because the “feeling of love,
companionship, mutual respect, partnership and affection has
disappeared is not, in itself, bad faith.”228 Though the justices might
not approve of Daniel’s behavior, this does not mean that he acted in
bad faith; even the district court, which ruled in favor of Ruth, found
that Daniel acted in good faith.229
Therefore, a reasonable compromise position on contractual
enforceability and consent would regard initial consent as nonabsolute in the absence of an agreement regarding embryo disposition
in the event of separation or divorce. Where there is agreement, such
agreement would, as desired by the Davis court, be presumed valid
and enforceable.230 Consent to such an agreement would be binding
and enforceable unless otherwise stipulated, and always mutually
modifiable.
222. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 347 (Strasberg-Cohen, dissenting). The “two people
together” was a specific context unique to surrogacy at the time of the law’s enactment. IVF
procedures are now open to all women no matter their sexuality or their marital status. Kraft,
supra note 1; see also Waldman, supra note 27, at 68–69 (describing Israel’s “pro-natalist”
culture).
223. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 386 (Dorner, J.).
224. Id. For additional discussions of “good faith” in Nahmani, see id. at 443–44
(Mazza, J.); and id. at 486–87 (Barak, President, dissenting).
225. Id. at 486 (Barak, President, dissenting).
226. Id. at 487 (“Daniel’s non-consent should be examined in its context. We are dealing
with an intimate relationship between the spouses. We are concerned with a relationship in
which love, companionship, mutual respect, partnership and affection are an inseparable
part.”).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
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D. Post-Davis American Jurisprudence Supporting Contractual
Enforceability
The few developments in American jurisprudence since Davis231
lend further support for the adoption of a presumption of
enforceability for frozen embryo disposition agreements. Four of the
five state supreme courts that have addressed divorce-related frozen
embryo disposition since Davis have held that a disposition
agreement between a couple and a clinic is presumptively
enforceable.232 The basic holding and reasoning of Davis continued
to hold, albeit with some important factual differences: (1) all five
couples at odds in these cases had signed agreements with the clinic
involved in the storage of their embryos;233 (2) in all but one case the
two parties were also the progenitors of the genetic material;234 (3) at
231. The issue has not appeared at all in Israeli Supreme Court jurisprudence since
Nahmani.
232. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (holding that if donors
cannot reach a mutual decision on disposition, then no use of the embryos can occur without
the signed authorization of both donors); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000)
(holding consent form signed by both parties and clinic giving woman control of preembryos after separation unenforceable); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (holding
agreement regarding disposition of pre-embryos entered into at time of IVF enforceable,
subject to each party’s right to change their mind up until the use or destruction of preembryos); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that agreements between
gamete donors regarding disposition of pre-embryos should generally be presumed valid,
binding, and enforceable); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002) (en banc)
(holding that when a married couple gets divorced, if they could not reach a mutual decision
on the disposition of their pre-embryos, they must petition the court for instructions). There
are also five state appellate court cases, three of which involved the absence of an
agreement. Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So.2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (holding pre-embryos to be
the property of neither party absent a valid agreement between them); Reber v. Reiss, 42
A.3d 1131 (P.A. Super. Ct. 2012) (ruling that the wife, in the absence of an agreement
between the parties, and likely confronting last opportunity for parenthood, should be
awarded frozen pre-embryos); In re Marriage of Nash, No. 62553-5-I, 2009 WL 1514842
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished decision upholding decision of trial court to rule on
disposition of frozen pre-embryos in absence of a valid agreement between parties); In re
Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (holding valid agreements
that indicate the clear intent of the parties regarding disposition of frozen embryos); Roman
v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding prior agreement regarding disposition
of frozen embryos enforceable).
233. In the Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey cases, the “agreement” at issue was
a consent form. In Litowitz, the parties had signed an egg donation agreement and
cryopreservation agreement. Witten also dealt with an embryo storage agreement. In all cases
except J.B., the wife asked the court for custody to implant, either herself or through a
surrogate. The husbands all petitioned for the status quo, adherence to the agreement
(donation to research in the case of Kass), or donation/adoption. In three cases (Witten,
Litowitz, and Kass) the wife contested the agreement and in two cases (J.B. and A.Z.) the
husband contested the agreement.
234. The exception was Litowitz, in which the couple used an egg donor.
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least three of the couples already had children via natural or assisted
means;235 and (4) only one female progenitor sought to defend her
last chance at genetic parenthood.236
The analytical focus of these later cases also shifts from what
was primarily a constitutional rights/interest-balancing discourse in
Davis to a combination of contract enforceability and issues of public
policy (e.g., whether a state could force unwanted parenthood on a
person). These courts dismiss the status and best interests of the child
argument entirely in favor of the contractual model arguments and a
discussion of “forced unwanted parenthood” and public policy. The
Supreme Court of Massachusetts added a dose of common sense
mutual modification and contract promotion to the Davis-initiated
premise of enforceability,237 while New Jersey’s Supreme Court
inserted an evaluation of the progenitors’ preferences and a
recognition of the trend towards the right not to procreate (autonomy)
outweighing the right to procreate even in the face of prior agreement
(the public policy argument).238 In the most recent state supreme
court case, In re Marriage of Witten, the Supreme Court of Iowa
summarized the pros and cons of what it saw as the three approaches
to resolving such disputes that had appeared in American
jurisprudence: (1) the contractual test (enforceable so long as not
violative of public policy),239 (2) contemporaneous mutual consent,240
and (3) a balancing test.241 The Iowa and New Jersey supreme courts
also brought back an argument from Nahmani II: both courts allowed
for a modified destruction order similar to the conditional grants
proposed by Justices Goldberg and Mazza.242
What can be gleaned from the later decisions is that American
courts, when they choose to rule on intimate family matters such as
the disposition of frozen pre-embryos, actually downplay the positive
235. See Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262; J.B., 783 A.2d at 710; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1053.
236. She lost on contractual grounds. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d at 179–82.
237. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1056–59.
238. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 717–20.
239. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Iowa 2003); see also Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261; Kass,
696 N.E. 2d 174; Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588 (Tenn. 1992).
240. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777. This approach was also recommended by the
Nahmani II minority. See supra Part I.B.2.
241. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779; see also J.B., 783 A.2d 707; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051;
Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588. All three cases, however, exhibited some internal inconsistencies.
242. Goldberg and Mazza’s idea would permit embryo destruction unless the objecting
party wished to pay the fees for continued storage until mutual agreement was reached. See
Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 401 (Goldberg, J.); id. at 443–444 (Mazza, J.).
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right to parenthood in favor of individual freedom not to procreate.243
In contrast to Nahmani II, most American courts that have addressed
the issue have ruled in favor of the party objecting to parenthood.244
However, the American cases lack consistency, sometimes resorting
to public policy rationales as a work-around to the actual issues in
dispute.
E.

Obstacles to International Consensus: The Analytical Limits of
Davis and Nahmani

While the above analysis provides valuable insight into the two
countries’ approaches to assisted reproductive technologies and their
value as the potential foundation for an international framework, it is
important to recognize the holes in both countries’ jurisprudence.
Israel has yet to deal with an embryo disposition case involving a
written agreement or an oral contract; in fact, it has not yet dealt with
this issue in the context of the Israeli Surrogacy Law or even with a
couple who is actually divorced.245 U.S. courts remain inconsistent in
their enforcement of agreements executed by couples and clinics, and
the issue has not reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Moreover, disputes
over the disposition of frozen embryos remain within the jurisdiction
of state courts, despite the Davis court’s discussion of constitutional
rights such as the rights to privacy and procreational autonomy.246
The scientific uncertainty regarding the length of viability of frozen

243. As Professor Helene Shapo wrote, “[M]ost American courts have relied on
biology . . . in order to locate decision-making authority over [frozen] pre-embryos.
However, the courts have used biology in the negative sense by favoring individual
autonomy and the right not to procreate over parental ties . . . .” Helene S. Shapo, Frozen
Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 97
(2002).
244. See supra Part II.D. But see Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)
(ruling that the wife, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, and likely
confronting the last opportunity for parenthood, should be awarded frozen pre-embryos).
245. A search of the available Israeli Supreme Court decisions and legal scholarship
produced no evidence of additional jurisprudence on the matter. However, the Israeli
legislature has made certain strides since Nahmani with the enactment of the Surrogacy
Agreements Law and, after a ten-year debate, the enactment of a law permitting egg
donation. See Dan Even, Knesset Approves Bill Easing Restrictions on Egg Donation in
Israel, HAARETZ (June 7, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/knesset-approvesbill-easing-restrictions-on-egg-donation-in-israel-1.294755; Elana Sztokman, A Decade in
the Making, Egg Donation Bill Passes Knesset, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (June 8, 2010, 9:51
AM), http://blogs.forward.com/sisterhood-blog/128609/a-decade-in-the-making-egg-donate
on-bill-passes-kn/; Judy Siegel, Ova Donation Bill Set to Pass in Knesset, JERUSALEM POST
(Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.jpost.com/HealthAndSci-Tech/Health/Article.aspx?id=169288.
246. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598–603.
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embryos247 also retains the potential for court cases to become moot,
though the Davis court in particular did not address the mootness
issue. Moreover, except for Kass, no state supreme court has properly
dealt with a case involving a party’s last chance for genetic
parenthood.248
Several important arguments and additional political minefields
also remain unexplored. Most notably, neither country inserted
adoption into the debate; genetic parenthood or freedom from genetic
parenthood remain the only promoted options while adoption remains
an “unattractive”249 or invisible alternative. In addition, an approach
like that taken by the Nahmani II majority (“developing the law”250)
would likely lead to grumblings about legislating from the bench,
certainly from within the United States if not from elsewhere.
However, after considering the limits of the case, I agree with
Northwestern Law Professor Helene Shapo’s statement that the
Nahmani II court did not adopt an “arguably wiser position than that
of the U.S.”251 While Israel, with its public encouragement of
parenthood, may remain the more “family-friendly”252 regime, the
fact that the Nahmani II court approached the case more as a matter
of expectations and justice (favoring life) rather than building upon
existing constitutional, contract, or other law, leaves the Israeli courts
open to significant future challenges.
CONCLUSION
International law clearly needs to catch up with science. Medical
research and surrogacy are global propositions, and access to IVF and
247. See id. at 598; see also Susan Donaldson James, Eleven Years Later, Triplet No. 3
Arrives, ABCNEWS (Dec. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/eleven-years-tripletarrives-frozen-embryo-batch/story?id=12492208.
248. Only the Pennsylvania Superior Court case, Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2012), addressed this issue. There is also a dispute currently winding its way through the
Maryland courts. Bailey Henneberg, Maryland Woman Wins Custody of Frozen Embryos,
GREENBELTPATCH (Jan. 7, 2013), http://greenbelt.patch.com/articles/judge-awards-mary
land-woman-custody-of-frozen-embryos?national=patch&ncid=edlinkuspatc00000006;
Tracee Wilkins, Judge Grants Stay in Divorced Couple’s Battle Over Embryos,
NBCWASHINGTON (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Judge-Grant
s-Stay-in-Divorced-Couples-Battle-Over-Embryos-186873792.html.
249. See Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 43–44.
250. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 357 (Tal, J.).
251. Shapo, supra note 243, at 102.
252. Waldman, supra note 27, at 105.
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cryogenic storage is no longer limited to a few “experiments.” Of
course, increased access and increased opportunity provides new
ammunition for marital disputes. This Comment, which seeks to
propose certain guidelines regarding embryo disposition to which a
majority of countries might be amenable, accepts the use of contract
law as a reasonable compromise that avoids wading into the murky
property/person “status” debate surrounding embryos. Contingency
agreements in case of separation or divorce should be standard
procedure at clinics who work with couples undergoing IVF
treatments. The United States and Israel, as leaders both in assisted
reproductive technologies and access to these technologies, should
take the initiative to create a more comprehensive regulatory
framework that would protect the rights of both parties in the couple
and prevent excess litigation. However, the pace of change will
remain slow so long as the United States retains its piecemeal and
detached approach to assisted reproductive technologies and the
international community continues to ignore the reproductive
repercussions of divorce.

